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of-use#LAAON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION  OF LAW
CASS  R. SUNSTEINt
IfI had known that not a single lunch counter would open as a result
of my action I could not have done differently than  I did. If I had known
violence would result, I could not have done differently than I did. I am
thankful  for the sit-ins iffor no other reason than that they provided me
with an opportunity for making a slogan into a reality, by  turning  a
decision into an action. It seems to me that this is what life is all about.
-Sandra  Cason.1
We are all Expressionists  part  of the time.  Sometimes we just want to
scream loudly at injustice, or to stand up and be counted.  These are noble
motives, but any serious revolutionist must often deprive himself of the
pleasures of self-expression. He must judge his actions by their ultimate
effects on institutions.
-Herbert  Simon.
2
INTRODUCTION
Actions are  expressive;  they carry meanings.-  This is true for
nearly  everything  we  do,  from  the  most  mundane  to  the  most
significant.  For example, a lawyer who wears a loud tie to court will
be signalling something distinctive about his self-conception and his
attitude toward others;  so too with a law professor who teaches in
blue jeans; so too with a student who  comes to class in a business
suit.  What can be said for nonverbal  acts applies to purely verbal
statements as well.  A bank president who uses the terms "Miss" and
"Mrs.,"  or who  refers to African Americans  as  "Negroes," will be
showing a wide  range of things  about his attitudes  on matters  of
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor ofJurisprudence, University
of Chicago.  I  am  grateful  to  Dan  Kahan,  Lawrence  Lessig, Martha  Nussbaum,
Richard Posner, and David Strauss for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
'JAMES  MILLER,  "DEMOCRACY  IS  IN  THE  STREETS":  FROM  PORT HURON  TO THE
SIEGE  OF CHICAGO 52 (1987).
2 HERBERT A.  SIMON,  MODELS OF  MY LIFE 281 (1991).
- In law, Lawrence Lessig offers the best discussion of this idea in The Regulation
of Social Meaning,  62  U.  CHI. L. REV.  943 (1995).  I owe a general debt to Lessig's
important paper  and especially to his discussion of the collective  action problem
posed by efforts at changing social meanings.  See id. at 993-1007.
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gender  and race.  So too with a  Southern politician  who uses the
terms "Ms." and "African American."
In  these and other cases, what the agent will be communicating,
or be taken to mean, may or may not have a great deal to do with
his particular intentions.  In  this sense, the meanings of actions are
not fully within the agent's control.  Indeed, some agents may not
even  be  aware  of the  relevant  meanings.  Consider  a  foreigner
whose  very foreignness  is often  signalled  by  obliviousness  to  the
social meanings of his actions.  What he says may be very different
from what he means.
The  social  meanings  of actions  are  very  much  a  function  of
existing  social  norms.  When  a  social  norm  tells  people  not to
smoke in public places, the social meaning of smoking is obtuseness,
discourtesy, or worse.  When a social norm requires people to dress
casually  for dinner,  formal  attire  "means"  something  bad,  like a
desire to seem superior or a manifestation of an odd social rigidity.
And when social norms change, social meaning changes too.  Thus
the social meanings of lighting up a cigarette, or engaging in  an act
of sexual harassment, or using a condom,  or refusing to eat meat,
are very different in 1996 from what they were in 1966, because  of
dramatic shifts in underlying norms.
What can  be said for actions  can also be said  for law.  Many
people  support  law because  of the  statements  made  by law,  and
disagreements  about law are frequently debates over the expressive
content  of law.  Much  of the  debate over  school segregation,  for
example,  was also a debate about the meaning of laws  calling for
segregation.  Plessy  v.  Ferguson4  asserted  that  such  laws  did  not
"mean"  black  inferiority;5  Brown  v.  Board of Education6  tried  to
respond  to  this  assertion  with  empirical  work  suggesting  the
contrary.'  Or, consider  debates  over  capital  punishment.  Many
people who oppose capital  punishment would be unlikely to shift
their position even if evidence were to show that capital punishment
does  have  a  deterrent  effect.  They  are  concerned  about  the
expressive content of capital punishment, not about its ineffective-
ness  as  a  deterrent  (or  about  other  nonexpressive  grounds  for
4 163 U.S. 537  (1896).
'  See  id.  at  544  (noting  that segregation  laws  "do  not  necessarily  imply  the
inferiority of either race to the other").
6  347 U.S.  483 (1954).
See id. at 494 n.1 1 (relying on social science evidence that showed that segrega-
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punishment).8  And many people who endorse capital punishment
would not be much moved by evidence that capital punishment does
not deter people from committing crimes.  Their primary concern
is  the  symbolic  or expressive  content  of the  law,  not  aggregate
murder rates.
9
Very recently,  the enormously lengthy and heated debate  over
flag burning has been permeated by expressive concerns.  If we ask
whether the debate is about how best to deter flag burning, we will
find  the  debate  unintelligible.  Few  people  have  burned  the
American flag in recent years, and it is reasonable to suppose that
a constitutional amendment making it possible  to criminalize flag
burning would have among its principal consequences  a dramatic
increase  in  annual  acts  of flag  burning.  In  fact,  adopting  a
constitutional amendment may be the best possible way to promote
the incidence of flag burning.  In these circumstances it seems clear
that those who support the amendment are motivated not so much
by consequences  as by expressive concerns. 1 0  They appear to want
to make a statement about the venality of the act of flag burning,
perhaps in order to affect social norms, perhaps because they think
that making the statement is intrinsically good.
Much of the  contemporary debate over  the regulation  of hate
speech is similar.  It is above all about the social meaning of such
regulations.  Do such regulations "mean" that victims of hate speech
require special paternalistic protections, are weak and thin-skinned,
and unable  to take care of themselves?  Or do they  "mean" that
bigotry is utterly unacceptable  in a liberal society?  Debates of this
kind could not plausibly be focused on consequences, for the stakes
are relatively  low and  thus cannot justify the  amount of time and
energy devoted to the issue.  In this way, debates over flag burning
8 1 do not attempt here to sort out the relation  between expressive  and other
grounds  for criminal punishment.
9 See Tom R. Tyler  & Renee Weber, Support  for the Death Penalty:  Instrumental
Response to Crime, or  Symbolic Attitude?, 17 L. &  SOC'Y REV. 21, 40 (1982) (finding that
"[p]olitical and social beliefs ...  exercise[d]  a strong influence upon support for
capital punishment, while the influence of  crime-related concerns was small"); Phoebe
C.  Ellsworth & Samuel  R. Gross, Hardening  of the Attitudes:  Americans' Views on the
Death Penalty,J.  Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1994, at 19,27 (finding that, while belief in the
death  penalty as an effective  deterrent hovered  around 60% from 1972  to  1991,
support for the death penalty during that period rose from 58% to 75%).
10  The same thing might be said about any law that drives conduct underground.
Even if the aggregate  incidence of harmful conduct is not decreased, some people
support relevant laws on expressive grounds.  Consider prohibitions  on the use of
drugs or on certain sexual activity such as homosexuality, adultery, and fornication.
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and debates over hate speech have a great deal in common; they are
expressive in character.
Consider, too, the subject of risk regulation.  In  environmental
protection,  public debate is  often focused  on the perceived social
meaning  of law.  Thus  the Endangered  Species Act has a special
salience  as  a  symbol  of a  certain  conception  of the  relationship
between  human  beings  and  their  environment,  and  emissions
trading systems are frequently challenged because they are said to
"make a statement" that reflects an inappropriate  valuation of the
environment. 1  In  the same way, mandatory recycling (as opposed
to  curbside  charges,  which  seem  far  better  from  an  economic
standpoint 2) may well receive public support on expressive grounds.
In  the legal profession, the same may also be true of mandatory pro
bono work (as opposed to compulsory donations from lawyers who
refuse to do such work)." 3
In  this  Article  I  explore  the  expressive  function  of law-the
function  of law in "making statements"  as opposed  to controlling
behavior directly. 4  I do so by focusing on the particular issue  of
"See  STEVEN  KELMAN,  WHAT  PRICE  INCENTIVES?:  ECONOMISTS  AND  THE
ENVIRONMENT 2 (1981) ("[T]he question of whether or not to use economic incentives
in environmental policy is not simply a technical question, but is also an ideological,
philosophical question..,  and many noneconomist participants in the environmental
debate  tend to react to the issue in ideological terms.").  I do not mean  to endorse
the view  that emissions  trading systems  reflect an inappropriate  valuation of the
environment.
12 See Peter  S.  Menell,  Beyond the  Throwaway Society:  An  Incentive Approach to
Regulating Municipal Solid  Waste,  17  ECOLOGY  L.Q.  655,  696  (1990)  (comparing
various solid waste regulatory policies  and finding that on a purely economic basis
perfect curbside charge policy and perfect deposit-refund policy always achieve the
first-best allocation  of resources).
" See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public  Policy:  A
Comment  on  the Symposium,  89  MICH.  L.  REV.  936,  947-51  (1991)  (arguing  that
mandatory  pro  bono  requirements  will  not  affect  lawyers'  conception  of their
professional duty if they are allowed to hire others to do the work on their behalf).
14 For valuable  discussions  of the  expressive  function  of legal  and  economic
norms,  see  ELIZABETH  ANDERSON,  VALUE  IN  ETHICS  AND  ECONOMICS 33-37  (1993)
(discussing expressive norms); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE  OF RATIONALITY  26-35
(1993)  [hereinafter NOZICK,  RATIONALITY]  (discussing "symbolic utility," the utility
that is imputed to an action or outcome  in accordance  with its symbolic meaning);
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL  EXPLANATIONS 370-88  (1981)  [hereinafter NOZICK,
EXPLANATIONS]  (discussing the symbolic  message of retributive punishment); Jean
Hampton, An  Expressive Theoy of Retribution, in  RETRIBUTIVISM  AND  ITS  CRITICS  1
(Wesley Cragg ed.  1992) (developing an expressive theory of retribution to explain
and justify retributive practice); see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 1996) (manuscript at 3) ("Punishment
is notjust a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that signifies
moral  condemnation.");  Richard  H.  Pildes  &  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Reinventing theON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION  OF  LAW  0
how  legal  "statements"  might  be  designed  to  change  social
norms. 5  I  catalogue  a range  of possible  (and  in my view legiti-
mate)  efforts  to  alter  norms  through  legal  expressions  about
appropriate  evaluative  attitudes.  I also  argue  that the  expressive
function  of law  makes  most  sense  in  connection  with  efforts  to
change  norms  and  that  if legal  statements  produce  bad  conse-
quences,  they should not be enacted  even if they seem reasonable
or noble.  Empirical  questions  loom  throughout,  and I do offer
several  empirical  claims;  but  my  goal  is  normative  as  well  as
descriptive or positive."
This  Article  is  divided  into  seven  parts.  Part  I  offers  some
definitional notes.  Part II discusses the use of legal "statements" as
a means of correcting  social norms that all  or most people  disap-
prove.  Part III deals with risk-taking behavior.  Part IV explores the
use of law to fortify norms involving the appropriate use of money.
Part  V  discusses  issues  of  equality.  Part  VI  qualifies  the  basic
argument.  It  discusses  the  relationship  between  the  expressive
function  of law  and  the  issue  of consequences;  it also  explores
constraints on the use of law to express judgments about appropri-
ate values.
I.  DEFINITIONAL NOTES
At the outset it is important to say that we might understand the
expressive  function  of law in  two different  ways.  First, and most
straightforwardly,  the  law's  "statement"  about,  for  example,  the
impropriety of monetary exchanges may be designed to affect social
norms  and  in  that  way  ultimately  to  affect  both judgments  and
behavior.  On this view, an expressive approach to law depends  on
an  assessment  of  social  consequences;  certain  expressions  are
Regulatoiy State, 62  U.  CHI.  L.  REv.  1,  66-71  (1995)  (arguing that  the expressive
dimensions of policy choices are appropriate concerns for policymakers); Pildes,supra
note 13, at 939-40 (arguing that cultural consequences are a significant but frequently
ignored dimension of public policy).
"5  This may be an example of the tendency in law schools to overemphasize the
function of law in producing and changing social norms. For an important corrective,
see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,  ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).  As Ellickson acknowledges, however, law provides fundamental entitlements
within which norm creation and management can occur at the private level.  There
are important overlaps between private norm entrepreneurs and legal efforts at norm
management  through  the  expressive  function  of law.  See  infra notes  35-36  and
accompanying  text.
16  I take up some descriptive and positive issues in Cass R. Sunstein, SocialNorrms
and Social Roles, 96 COLuM.  L. REV. (forthcoming May  1996).
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favored  because  they  will  (ultimately)  have  good  consequences.
Here there is a prediction about the facts:  an appropriately framed
law  may  influence  social  norms  and  push  them  in  the  right
direction.  For example, if  the law  mandates  recycling, perhaps  it
will  affect  social  norms  about  the  environment  in  a  way  that is
different from  (and better  than) the  way curbside  charges  might
affect norms.  Or if the law wrongly treats something-let us suppose
reproductive  capacities-as  a  commodity,  social  norms  may  be
affected  in a troublesome way.
Sometimes  the  claim  that  the  law  affects  norms  is  plausible.
Prevailing norms,  like preferences  and beliefs,  are not a presocial
given  but a product of a complex  set of social  forces, 1 7  possibly
including law.'"  Laws  designed  to produce  changes in norms will
be my focus here.  But sometimes people support a law, not because
of its  effects  on norms, but because  they believe  that  it  is intrin-
sically  valuable  for the  relevant  "statement"  to be  made. 9  And
sometimes law will have little or no effect on social norms.  Society
is filled with  legal provisions  allowing market  exchanges  of goods
and services-like  pets  and  babysitting, for  example-that  are not
seen  as mere commodities  but are valued  for  reasons  other than
their use.  The question, therefore, remains whether the statement
will have the claimed effect on social norms.  It  is fully plausible to
say  that,  although  a  law  that  permits  prostitution  reflects  an
inappropriate  valuation  of sexuality, any adverse  effect of the law
on social  norms  is  so  small  as  to  be  an  implausible  basis  for
objection.
Thus a second understanding of the expressive function of law
does  not  concern  itself  with  effects  on  norms."  Instead,  its
grounding  is  connected  with  the  individual  interest  in  integrity.
Following a brief but suggestive  discussion by Bernard  Williams,
21
we might  say that personal  behavior  is  not concerned  solely  with
producing states of affairs and that, if it were, we would have a hard
time making sense of important aspects of our lives.  There are also
17  See id. (manuscript pt. III.B).
,I  focus here on law  motivated by norm change.
"See  supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20 For a discussion of the role of  symbols in politics, see ELLICKSON, supra note 15,
at 116-18.
21 See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,  in  UTILITARIANISM:  FOR AND
AGAINST  108-09 (JJ.C. Smart  & Bernard Williams  eds.,  1973)  (noting that people
often refuse to do a disagreeable act even though their refusal will result in worse
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issues  involving  personal  integrity,  commitment,  the  narrative
continuity  of  a  life,  and  the  individual  and  social  meaning  of
personal  conduct.  The expressive  dimension of action can be an
important reason for action.22  Williams  offers  cases that might be
understood  in  these  terms.  Someone  might  refuse  to  kill  an
innocent  person  at the  request of a  terrorist,  even  if the  conse-
quence  of the refusal is that many more people will be killed.  Or
a pacifist might refuse  to take ajob in a munitions  factory, even if
the refusal will have no salutary effects.
Our responses  to  these cases  are  not adequately  captured  in
terms  that  ignore  expressive  considerations.23  It is  possible  that
the refusal to kill an innocent person is consequentially justified on
balance,  for people who  refuse  to  commit bad  acts  may cultivate
attitudes  that lead  to value-maximizing  behavior.2 4  But this  is  a
complex matter.  My point  is  only that human behavior  is  some-
times  a function of expressive  considerations. 2 5  Indeed,  it should
be  possible  to  model  behavior  by  identifying  the  role  of  such
considerations.26   We  might  agree  on  this  point  even  if we  also
believe that consequences count (mediated as they are by expressive
norms) and that people should not be fanatical.27
There is a rough analog at the social and legal level.  A  society
might  identify  the  norms to  which  it is committed  and insist on
those norms via law, even if the consequences  of the insistence  are
obscure  or unknown.  A  society might, for  example,  insist on an
antidiscrimination  law for  expressive  reasons  even  if it does  not
22 See NOZICK,  RATIONALITY, supra note  14, at 26-35 (discussing symbolic utility).
'  I should note, however, that it is not clear that Williams  is interested in the
expressive meaning of action; he may instead be concerned with the agent's capacity
to make sense of his or her life.  There are interesting questions about the extent to
which the agent may be both "saying" things and "hearing" those things via conduct.
24  See ROBERT H.  FRANK,  PASSIONS  WITHIN  REASON:  THE STRATEGIC ROLE  OF THE
EMOTIONS  10-30  (1988).
'  And  vice  versa.  See  Lessig, supra note  3,  at  1012  ("Meaning  construction
is more than speaking differently.  For it to function,  it must succeed in  recreat-
ing understandings  and expectations.  To create these understandings  and expec-
tations ...  requires  a change  in behavior  sufficient to internalize  a set of under-
standings that construct this new meaning, or, in the case of [a] defensive construc-
tion,  a  change  in  behavior  to  resecure  a  social  meaning  that would  otherwise
dissolve.").
26 See  GARY  S.  BECKER,  ACCOUNTING  FOR  TASTE  (forthcoming  1996);  TIMUR
KURAN,  PRIVATE TRUTHS,  PUBLIC  LIES:  THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES  OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION  1-21 (1995) (discussing "preference falsification," the act of misrepre-
senting one's genuine wants under perceived  social pressures). 27See infra part V.
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know whether the law actually helps  members of minority groups.
A  society  might  endorse  or  reject  capital  punishment  because  it
wants to express a certain understanding of the appropriate course
of action when  one person  takes  the  life of another.  The  point
bears on the cultural role of law, adjudication,  and even Supreme
Court decisions.  The empirical effects of those decisions are highly
disputed.28  If  the Supreme  Court holds  that segregation  is unlaw-
ful, that certain restrictions on hate speech violate the First Amend-
ment, or that students  cannot be asked to pray in school, the real-
world  consequences  may be much  smaller  than  is  conventionally
thought.  But the  close  attention  American  society  pays  to  the
Court's  pronouncements  is  connected  with  the  expressive  or
symbolic  character  of  those  pronouncements.  When  the  Court
makes a decision,  it is often taken  to be speaking on behalf of the
nation's basic  principles and commitments.  This assumption  is a
matter of importance quite apart from its consequences  as conven-
tionally  understood.  It  is  customary  and  helpful  to point to  the
Court's educative effect. 9  But perhaps  the expressive effect of the
Court's decisions, or their expressive function, better captures what
is often at stake.
The expressive grounds for action should be distinguished from
action  undertaken  solely  because  it  is  believed  to be right.  It  is
possible  to  participate  in  an  act  of political  protest because  the
protest  is  for a good  cause without  believing that participation  is
justified because it is expressive.  Throughout  this Article I will be
dealing with  actions, including legal  actions,  that are expressive  in
character.
I  do not claim  that the  expressive  effects  of law,  thus  under-
stood, are decisive  or that they cannot be countered  by a demon-
stration  of more  conventional  bad  consequences.  In  fact,  I will
argue otherwise and in that way try to vindicate  Simon's remark in
the epigraph to this Article;  my principal aim is to defend  laws that
attempt  to alter  norms, rather  than  laws  that merely  "speak."  It
cannot be doubted, however, that the expressive  function is a large
part of legal debate.  Without understanding the expressive function
28 See  GERALD N.  ROSENBERG,  THE HOLLOW  HOPE:  CAN  COURTS  BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 28 (1991)  (noting that "attempts to ground [the view that courts can
effectively bring about social reform]  empirically are not entirely satisfying").
See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?,  67
N.Y.U.  L.  REV. 961,  964 (1992) ("[T]he Supreme Court cannot be fully understood
except as an institution with educative  responsibilities, responsibilities  that depend
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of law,  we will  have  a  hard  time  getting  an  adequate  handle  on
public views on such issues as civil rights, prostitution, the environ-
ment, endangered  species,  capital punishment, and abortion.
II.  THE EXPRESsIVE  FUNCTION AND  COLLECTIVE  ACTION PROBLEMS
Many social norms solve collective action problems. 30  Some of
these  problems  involve  coordination;  others  involve  prisoner's
dilemmas.  Norms solve such problems by imposing social sanctions
on  defectors. 3'  When  defection  violates  norms,  defectors  will
30 See ELuICKSON,  supra note 15,  at 167  ("[M]embers of tight social groups  ...
informally  encourage  each  other  to  engage  in  cooperative  behavior.");  EDNA
ULLMANN-MARGALrr,  THE EMERGENCE  OF NoRMs  22-60  (1977)  (arguing that norms
are likely  to  evolve  to  help people  achieve  cooperative  outcomes  in  prisoner's
dilemma situations).
"  I am offering the traditional account here, but there are serious difficulties with
this account.  The most serious problem is that any collective action problem can be
characterized as such because of a wide range of norms, and not only because of the
particular  norm that is said to be producing the problem.  The traditional account
focuses  on one norm, but the problem  is the product of a wide range of them.
Suppose, for example, that there is no norm against littering; that people think
that there is too much litter; and that they would like to create a new, anti-littering
norm.  Would it be right to say that this case involves a collective action problem that
would best be solved by the aid of  a new social norm against littering? The statement
would not be false but it would be misleading and incomplete.  What gives rise to the
collective  action problem is an array of individual judgments and desires that are
themselves  (in all likelihood) a function of social norms.  There are, for example,
norms against clutter, norms involving certain conceptions of aesthetics, norms about
public spaces.  If people "want" a new norm-the norm against littering-their desire
probably stems from many other norms, such as norms favoring clean rather than
dirty parks, norms in favor of shared rather than maldistributed burdens, and norms
in favor of solutions through norms rather than coercion or fines.
When  a situation  is supposed  to create  a prisoner's  dilemma that would  be
satisfied by some norm Z, the situation presupposes a range of norms A through Y,
which are being held constant and not being put in contention.  The question then
becomes:  Why is  it that norm  Z  (the norm  with respect to  littering) is put into
question, rather than some other norm (the norm favoring clean parks)? Why should
a norm be established in favor of cleaning up after one's dog, instead of  changing the
norms  governing  exposure  to  the  relevant  mess?  This  question  has  yet  to  be
addressed in the existing work on collective action and social norms. The traditional
account takes a set of norms as given, without seeing that they might themselves be
altered, rather than altering the particular  norm that has been put into question.
On the economic account, we might solve the problem by asking which norms
can be changed most cheaply. Just as one person in a legal controversy might be the
cheapest  cost avoider, so  one norm  in a  collective action  problem might  be the
cheapest target of norm management.  It is plausible to think that it is much more
efficient to create a norm in favor of clean-up than to create a norm making people
approve of clutter and mess.  On this view, we would not inquire into the merits or
basis of existing norms, but ask more simply which norms can be altered at lowest
cost.  I speculate  that an implicit judgment of this kind lies behind the traditional
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probably feel shame, an important motivational force.  The commu-
nity may enforce its norms through informal punishment, the most
extreme form of which  is ostracism.  But the most effective use of
norms is ex ante.  The expectation of shame-a kind of social "tax,"
sometimes a very  high one-is usually  enough to produce  compli-
ance.
Thus,  for example,  if there is a norm in favor of cooperation,
people  may be  able  to  interact  with  one  another  in  a  way  that
prevents  their  actions from  being  self-defeating.32  For example,
professors  write  tenure  letters  and  engage  in  a  wide  range  of
administrative  tasks  that  they  could  refuse  to  do  at  little  cost
(putting  to  one  side  shame-the  emotional  price  of  violating
institutional norms).  Or, suppose that a community is pervaded by
a strong norm against littering.  If  the norm  is truly pervasive, an
important problem  of environmental  degradation  can be  solved
without  any need for legal intervention."  The norm can do what
the  law  would  do  at  possibly  much  greater  cost. 3 4   The  norms
associated  with  "courtesy" are  an  especially  important  source  of
successful  group interaction.
Sometimes,  however, good norms do  not exist, and bad ones
exist  in  their  stead-where  we  understand  "good"  or  "bad"  by
reference  to  the  functions  of norms  in  solving  collective  action
problems.  Imagine, for example, that there is no norm in favor of
refusing  to litter, or that there is even a norm in favor of littering.
In  the face  of such norms, the social meaning of littering may be
independence and fearlessness, and the social meaning of cleaning
up or failing  to litter may be fastidiousness  or even  cowardice  or
neurosis.  In such  a situation a society  would, under imaginable
assumptions,  do  well  to reconsider and reconstruct its norms.  It
may  be  able  to  do  so  through voluntary  efforts.  Indeed,  norm
entrepreneurs in  the  private  sphere  attempt  to  change  norms  by
identifying  their bad consequences  and trying to shift the bases  of
approach  to this problem.
S2See  DAVID  W.  BROWN,  WHEN  STRANGERS  COOPERATE:  USING  SOCIAL
CONVENTIONS  TO  GOVERN  OURSELVES  23-54  (1995)  (describing  various  "meta-
conventions,"  precepts  of behavior  that clarify the basis for our cooperation  with
strangers  and consequently  make coordination problems easier to solve).
" For  a detailed  discussion of the hypothesis  that close-knit  groups  generate
norms that maximize the objective welfare of group members, see ELLICKSON, supra
note  15, at 167-83.
'  For a discussion of the role of norms in environmental  protection, see CAROL
M.  ROSE,  PROPERTY  AND  PERSUASION:  ESSAYS  ON  THE  HISTORY,  THEORY,  AND
RHETORIC OF  OWNERSHIP 283-85  (1994).ON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF  LAW
shame  and  pride.  Many  norm  entrepreneurs  are  alert  to  the
existence of collective action problems.  We can find such entrepre-
neurs in different sectors of social life-consider Louis Farrakhan,
Catharine MacKinnon, William BennettJerry Falwell, Martin Luther
King, Jr.,  Rush  Limbaugh.  In  the  environmental  setting,  public
interest groups often carry out this role by pressing private conduct
in environmentally desirable directions, sometimes by providing new
grounds for both pride  (a kind of informal  social  "subsidy")  and
shame (a kind of informal  social "tax"). 5
But sometimes these private efforts fail.  When this is so, the law
might be enlisted as a corrective.  In fact the least controversial use
of the expressive function of law operates in this way.  Here the goal
is to  reconstruct existing norms and to change the social meaning
of action through a legal expression or statement about appropriate
behavior.  Insofar  as  regulatory  law  is  concerned  with  collective
action problems, 6 this is a standard idea, especially in the environ-
mental  context,'  but  also  in  the  setting  of automobile  safety,
occupational  safety and health, and many  other problems  as  well.
What  is  perhaps  less  standard  is  to  see  the  law  as  an  effort to
produce adequate social norms.  The law might either do the work
of such  norms,  or instead  be  designed  to  work  directly  against
existing norms and to push them in new directions.  The latter idea
is  grounded on the view  that law will have moral weight and thus
convince  people  that existing  norms  are bad  and  deserve  to  be
replaced by new ones.
More  particularly,  government  might  think  that  choice  is,
roughly speaking,  a function of the intrinsic utility of choice, the
reputational utility of choice, and the effects of choice on a person's
self-conception. 8  If someone cleans up after his dog, or fails to do
so,  his decision  may reflect not only the  act's intrinsic value,  but
also anticipated reputational effects as well as effects on the agent's
self-esteem.  We  can thus extend the game theoretic insight that a
SCf.  STEPHAN  SCHMIDHEINY,  CHANGING  COURSE:  A  GLOBAL  BUSINESS
PERSPECTIVE  ON  DEVELOPMENT  AND  THE  ENVIRONMENT  181-330  (1992)  (discussing
environmentally protective measures voluntarily adopted by business).
6 See ANTHONY  Ocus, REGULATION  5-20 (1995).
37 See,  e.g.,  R.  KERRY TURNER  ET AL.,  ENVIRONMENTAL  ECONOMICS:  AN  ELEMEN-
TARY  INTRODUCTION  65-78  (1993)  (discussing  the  characteristics  of  market
economies).
38 See BECKER, supra note 26 (discussing social capital); KURAN, supra note 26, at
35 (arguing that "the choice of public preference gives rise to three distinct returns:
intrinsic utility, reputational utility, and expressive  utility").
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person's behavior often depends on expectations about behavior by
other people.  Behavior and choice are a product not only of other
people's  behavior, but  also  of  the  perceived judgments of other
people, and those judgments have a great deal to do with-indeed
they constitute-social  norms.  People act in accordance  with their
perceptions  of  what  other  people  think.  Sometimes  they  act
strategically in order to avoid other people's opprobrium.  It follows
that individual rationality and self-interest are  a function of social
norms and are not sensibly opposed  to them. 3 9
Reputational  utility is of course produced by social norms, and
it may shift over time because it is likely to be endogenous to both
existing information and to law.  If choice that produces collective
harm  is driven by reputational  utility in the direction of behavior
that has low (net) intrinsic utility for the agent, government  might
think it appropriate to shift reputational utility, so that overall utility
might  thereby  be  increased.  When  norms  shift,  the  expressive
content of acts shifts as well, thus producing changes in reputational
effects.
The  most conventional  example  involves  legal mandates  that
take  the  place  of good  norms,  by  requiring  certain  forms  of
behavior through statutory requirements accompanied by significant
enforcement  activity.  Environmental  law,  for  example,  imposes
legal  mandates  to  control  industrial  pollution;  it  adds  a  large
commitment of enforcement resources.
But there  is  a subtler and  more  interesting  class  of cases,  of
special importance for understanding the expressive function of law.
These  cases  arise  when  the  relevant  law  announces  or signals  a
change in social norms unaccompanied by  much in the way of enforce-
ment activity.  Consider, for example, laws that forbid littering and
laws  that  require people  to clean  up after  their  dogs.  In  many
localities such laws are rarely enforced through the criminal law, but
they have an important effect in signalling appropriate behavior and
in inculcating  the  expectation  of social  opprobrium  and, hence,
shame in  those who  deviate from the announced  norm.  With or
without enforcement activity, such laws can help reconstruct norms
and the social meaning of action.  Someone who fails  to clean up
after his dog may then be showing disrespect or even contempt for
others.  Many,  most, or all people may see things this way, and the
" For a discussion of this point and its implications, see Sunstein, supra note 16
(manuscript pt. III.C).ON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF LAW
result can be large changes  in behavior.  Eventually there  can be
norm  cascades,  as  reputational  incentives  shift  behavior  in  new
directions. 0  It should be unsurprising to find that, in many places,
people clean up after their dogs even though this is not especially
pleasant and even though the laws are rarely enforced.
When  legally-induced  shifts  in  norms  help  solve  collective
action problems, there should be no objection in principle.41  Here,
then, is the least controversial  case for the expressive  function  of
law.
III.  NORMS  INVOLVING  DANGEROUS  BEHAVIOR
Often  the  expressive  function  of  law  is  brought  to  bear  on
dangerous behavior,  including behavior that is  dangerous  only or
principally  to  one's  self.  Of  course,  all  behavior  creates  risks:
driving  a  car,  walking  on  city  streets,  volunteering  for military
service.  When government  tries to change norms that "subsidize"
risk-taking  behavior,  it must  do  so  because  of a judgment  that
overall welfare will thereby be promoted.  This judgment might be
rooted  in  an understanding  that the  intrinsic  utility of the  act  is
relatively low and that reputational incentives are the real source of
the behavior.  We are dealing, then, with classes of cases in which
the danger accompanying choice  means  that intrinsic utility is  not
high, but risk-taking behavior persists because of social norms.
There  are  numerous  examples.  Elijah  Anderson's  vivid
sociological analysis of life in an African American ghetto shows that
social norms create  a variety  of risks. 42  Powerful norms  motivate
people  to use and sell drugs;4 3  powerful norms motivate  teenagers
to  engage  in  sexual  activity  that  may  result  in  pregnancy.44
Anderson shows that, with respect to drugs, pregnancy, and the use
of firearms, behavior appears to be driven in large part by reputati-
onal  effects.  In  fact,  for  much  risk-taking  behavior,  especially
among  young  people,  social  norms  are  crucial.45  Consider,  for
4
1 See KURAN,  suPra note 26, at 3.
4' Note, however, that these are unlikely to be Pareto improvements.  There will
be losers as well as winners.  For a discussion of some further complexities, see infra
part VI.A.
42 See ELIJAH  ANDERSON,  STREETwIsE:  RACE,  CLASS,  AND  CHANGE  IN  AN  URBAN
COMMUNITY  76 (1990) (explaining that the Northon community has become "even
more vulnerable to a variety of social ills, from teenage pregnancy to rampant drug
use").
43 See id. at 77-111.
44 See id. at 112-34.
45This is a principal theme in FRED M. HECHINGER,  FATEFUL CHOICES:  HEALTHY
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example,  the  existence  of powerful  norms  governing  cigarette
smoking, alcohol use, the consumption of unlawful drugs, diet and
exercise,  and  carrying  and  using  firearms.  We  might  readily
imagine, for example,  that a decision to smoke a cigarette, or not
to  buckle  a  seatbelt,  would  be  a  function  not  primarily  of the
intrinsic utility of the underlying act but instead largely a function
of the reputational effects.
We  might  take  the  term  "political  correctness"  to  connote  a
willingness to say or do something not because of its intrinsic value
but  because  of  reputational  effects.  So  understood,  political
correctness is hardly an isolated phenomenon.  It occurs whenever
people  attempt  to  avoid  the  reputational  costs  associated  with
violating norms in their community.  And when norms shift, turning
reputational costs into benefits and vice versa, behavior can shift as
well.  Certainly this is true when acts and statements are a product
of pressures that can make people "falsify" their internal judgments
and  beliefs.46  With  respect  to  dangerous  behavior,  it would  be
desirable if norms that subsidize choice were turned into norms that
are neutral with respect to choice or even into norms that operate
as implicit taxes.
Norm entrepreneurs in the private sector can play an important
role here.  Thus, for example, there has been a dramatic  decrease
in cigarette  smoking among young African Americans,  a decrease
apparently fueled by changes in social norms for which private norm
entrepreneurs  are partly responsible.4  In the relevant communi-
ties,  the  social  meaning  of  smoking  is  not  attractiveness  and
rebelliousness,  but dirtiness  and willingness  to be  duped.  More
broadly, religious leaders often try to change social norms involving
risky conduct such as promiscuous  behavior.
But here as elsewhere, private efforts  may be unsuccessful.  In
this  light,  law  might  attempt  to  express  a judgment  about  the
underlying activity in such a way as to alter social norms.  If we see
norms as a tax on or subsidy  to choice,  the law might attempt to
change a subsidy into a tax, or vice versa.  In fact, this is a central,
even if implicit, goal  behind much  risk regulation  policy.  Educa-
tional campaigns often have the goal of changing the social meaning
YOUTH  FOR THE 21sT CENTURY (1992).
0 See generally KURAN,  supra note  26, at  3-21  (discussing the  significance  of
preference  falsification).
" See  Sunstein,  supra note  16  (manuscript  pt.  I.C)  (describing  the  private
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of risk-taking  activity.48  Going beyond  the  provision of informa-
tion,  coercion  might be  defended  as  a way  of increasing  social
sanctions  on certain behavior.  Through time,  place, and manner
restrictions  or flat  bans,  for  example,  the  law  might attempt  to
portray behavior like smoking, using drugs, or engaging in unsafe
sex as  a sign of individual weakness.
Are such efforts  illiberal or unacceptably  paternalistic?  Under
imaginable assumptions,  they should not be so regarded. Choices
are  a  function  of  norms  for  which  individual  agents  are  not
responsible and which, on reflection, many or most agents may not
endorse.  This  is  conspicuously  so  in  the  context  of risk-taking
activity involving cigarettes,  drugs, unsafe sex, and firearms.  Much
discussion of whether law should respect "preferences" or "choices"
is confused by virtue of its silence on the matter of social norms.49
People  may follow  such norms despite  the fact  that they deplore
them.
It  is  important  in  this  regard  that  social  norms  are  often  a
function of existing information.  If people believe that smoking is
dangerous to themselves  and to others, it is more likely that social
norms will discourage smoking.  Certainly there has been a dramatic
norm  cascade  in  the  last thirty  years  with  respect  to  smoking,  a
cascade  fueled  in large  part  by judgments  about  adverse  health
effects.  Shifts in norms governing behavior may well be produced
by  new  information about risk (although  norms can shift in both
directions; sometimes a  perception of dangerousness  increases the
attractiveness  of behavior).  One  can imagine  similar information-
induced norm cascades with respect to diet, exercise, and unsafe sex.
In fact, people often  try to bring norms into accord  with existing
information.  When there is conflict between the two, people may
experience  dissonance."  The  result  of  the  dissonance  may
produce  new  norms  or new understandings  of existing  informa-
tion.51
'8 See Lessig, supra  note 3, at 1022 ("[E]ducation does, or can do, much more than
convey information....  [I]n some cases education can alter social meanings.").
" Lessig provides  a good corrective.  See id.
5o See ELLuCKSON, supra note  15, at 174-75.
5" It would  be wrong, however, to suggest that norms are closely aligned with
existing information.  See MARY  DOUGLAS  &  AARON  WILDAVSKY,  RISK AND  CULTURE
(1982) (arguing that human information processing is not wholly objective and that,
in many cases, people delegate decisionmaking  processes  to institutions).
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Because information is the least intrusive regulatory strategy, it
should be the preferred option.  Whether more aggressive strategies
make sense depends on the details.
IV.  NORMS  INVOLVING  THE  USE  OF MONEY
A complex network of social norms governs the acceptable uses
of money.  This is so in  two different respects.  First,  some  social
norms  impose  sanctions  on  using money  as  a reason  for  action.
Here  people  are  not supposed  to  engage  in  certain  acts  if  their
reason  for  doing  so  is  financial  gain.  Second,  and  even  more
intriguing, some social norms make different kinds of money non-
fungible:  there  the  prevailing  norms  require  different  kinds  of
money to be used for different purposes. 5 2  These sets  of norms
raise many complexities.  They are also entangled with the expres-
sive  function  of  law.  Finally,  they  suggest  that  it  is  sometimes
inappropriate  to  infer general  valuations  from particular  choices,
because  those  choices are a function of norms that are  limited to
the context in which they are made.
A.  Norms Against the  Use of Money
Let us begin with norms punishing the use of money as a reason
for action.  A recent essay by Joel Waldfogel,  The Deadweight Loss of
Christmas, 5"  will  help  to  introduce  the  point.  The  essay  finds  no
less than four million dollars in annual deadweight losses from the
fact  that  people  give  in-kind  presents  rather  than  mere  cash  on
Christmas  Day.  Waldfogel's analysis is simple.  For those who give
presents,  the cost  of Christmas  is higher than  it would be  if  they
gave  cash  instead.  The  cost  of  gift-giving  includes  not just the
expenditure  of money, but also  the resources  expended  on  gift-
selection.  And  for  those  who  receive  presents,  the  benefit  is
typically  lower than it would  be  if  they received  cash.  The recip-
ient would  be  better off if  he  received  cash,  which  he  could  use
as he wished-just as  food stamps  are worth less  than their dollar
value  because,  unlike  cash,  they can  only be spent on food.  The
52 See VIVIANA A.  ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 96 (1994) (discussing
the ways  in  which  tipping  creates  "distance  and  inequality  between  donor  and
recipient").
'Joel  Waldfogel,  The  Deadweight Loss of Christmas, 83  AM.  ECON.  REV.  1328
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four million dollar  "waste" is  a result of these sorts  of consider-
ations.
What does Waldfogel  neglect?  The answer has a great deal to
do with prevailing social norms.'  In many contexts,  social norms
severely discourage the giving of cash rather than, say, a tie, a book,
or a sweater.  Under existing norms, a cash present-from a husband
to a wife, for example-may reflect contempt or indifference.  This
is precisely because cash is fungible.  A tie or a book-whether  or
not it is a wonderful  tie or a wonderful  book-fits well with norms
that call for a degree of individualized attention on the part of the
donor.  Part of what Waldfogel neglects  is the cluster of Christmas-
related  norms  and  the  social  meaning  of  diverse  forms  of gift-
giving.
55
What can be said for Christmas  can be said for many  areas  of
social life where money is deemed an inappropriate basis for action.
For example, if someone asks an adult neighbor to shovel his walk
or to mow his lawn in return for money, the request will often be
regarded  as  an  insult,  because  it  is  based  on  an  inappropriate
valuation of the neighbor.  The request embodies  a conception  of
neighborliness that is, under existing norms,judged improper.  This
is so even if the offeree might clearly prefer to receive, say, twenty-
five  dollars  over  not  mowing  a  lawn  for,  say,  an  hour.  Quite
generally  it is  inappropriate  to  offer  money  to  one's  friends  in
return for hurt feelings, disappointments,  tasks, or favors.  In fact,
the universe of cases  in which norms disallow monetary exchange
is very large, and unremarked upon only because it is so taken for
granted.  It would be quite strange to give an adult a certain sum of
money after hearing that his parent had died, or to ask a colleague
to clean up your office for, say, two hundred and fifty dollars.  This
is so even  though favors  are of course common,  and even  though
there  can  be  "in  kind"  implicit  transactions  between  friends,
neighbors, and even spouses.
There is often a connection between norms that block exchanges
and ideas about equal citizenship.  The exchange can be barred by
5'  A separate issue has to do with cash management as a strategy of self-control.
Someone might prefer a tie to its cash equivalent because the cash would end up in
the  bank,  given  the  agent's  self-control  strategies.  See  Richard  Thaler, Mental
Accounting Matters (1995) (manuscript at 1-6) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the University of Chicago Business School).
"There  is a background  issue about why we have some norms and not others.
I do not have an answer  to this question.  Some norms may, however, be helpful
strategies of self-control.  See id.
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social  norms  because  of  a  perception  that,  while  there  may  be
disparities  in  social wealth,  the  spheres in which  people  are very
unequal ought not to invade realms of social life in which equality
is a social norm or goal.5   The prohibition on vote-trading  is one
example.  So  too with certain  complex social  bans on the use of
wealth to buy services or goods from other people.5"  Some part of
the intricate web of norms covering the exchange of money among
both friends and strangers  is connected  with the principle of civic
equality.  Monetary exchange would reflect forms of inequality that
are not legitimate in certain spheres.
Familiar objections  to "commodification" 8  are part and parcel
of social norms banning the use of money.  The claim is that people
ought not to trade sexuality or reproductive capacities on markets
because  market  exchange  of  these  "things"  is  inconsistent  with
social norms identifying  their appropriate  valuation.59  The claim
is not that markets value sexuality "too much" or "too little;" rather,
it  is  that markets  value  these  activities  in  the wrong  way.  Judge
Posner's  well-known  writings  on the  "baby  market"  do not quite
address  this particular objection.60  Under existing practice,  social
norms of course affect the adoption of children and impose severe
sanctions on any effort (literally) to sell children even to willing and
loving parents.  The fact that the adoption market is accompanied
by safeguards making any "sale" at most implicit is an important way
of reaffirming existing norms.
'  For a discussion of this  idea see  MICHAEL  WALZER,  SPHERES  OF JUSTICE:  A
DEFENSE  OF  PLURALISM  AND  EQUALrrY  (1983).
-7 I do not mean to approve of the ban on these  exchanges, a matter that turns,
as I discuss below, on a complex range of considerations.
" See Margaret J. Radin,  Market-Inalienability, 100  HARv.  L.  REV.  1849,  1871
(1987).
" We  should  be wary,  however,  of a rapid  movement  away  from judgments
about appropriate  modes of valuation  to a particular position about law.  See infra
notes  65-66  (discussing  the relationship  between  tort law  and  the reluctance  of
individuals to insure against physical and emotional losses).  This is a basis, I think,
for questioning some of the applications  of the general claims in ANDERSON,  supra
note  14.
'  See generally RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  SEX  AND  REASON  409-17 (1992);  Richard A.
Posner,  The  Regulation of  the  Market in  Adoptions,  67  B.U.  L.  REV.  59  (1987)
(describing how a free market in babies would operate and explaining why the market
should be allowed to function in this area); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7J. LEGAL STUD.  323 (1978) (proposing a practical
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B.  Law and Money
The point very much bears on law.  In many ways,  law tries to
fortify norms regulating the use of money and to prevent new social
practices from eroding those norms.  This is an important domain
for the expressive  use  of law.  It is connected  with the  effort  to
create  separate social  spheres-some  in which  money is appropri-
ately a basis for action, some in which money cannot be used.
The law bans a wide range of uses of money.  Votes cannot be
traded  for  cash;  the  same  is  true  of body parts.  Prostitution  is
illegal.  There is of course a sharp  social debate  about surrogate
motherhood, and those who seek legal proscriptions are thinking in
expressive  terms.6  One of their goals  may be  to fortify existing
social  norms  that  insulate  reproduction  from  the  sphere  of
exchange.62   Or their  argument  may  be less  instrumental:  They
may seek to make a "statement" about reproduction without also
seeking to affect social norms.
C.  Positive and Normative Statements:  Hazardous  General
Inferences  from Particular  Norm-Dependent Choices
The  existence  of norms involving  cash  exchange  bear on  the
possibility of inferring global judgments from particular consump-
tion choices that are dependent on context-specific norms.  Here I
am concerned not with norms banning the use of dollars as a reason
for action,  but  instead  with  norms  that  subsidize  or  tax certain
consumption decisions.  The point is important because economists
often  explore  particular  choices  as  a  means  of  understanding
general valuations.'  But often this is a mistake, because particular
choices  are  a  function  of  social  norms  that  are  limited  to  the
particular context.  In a different context, the governing norms may
be quite different.
Suppose, for example, that someone buys Volvos or some safety
device for her home.  Can we infer from such purchases something
about that person's  valuation of life and health?  If the particular
61 See ANDERSON,  supra note  14, at 168-86.
62 See  e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d  1227 (NJ. 1988); Doe v. Kelly, 307 N.W.2d 438
(Mich.  1981),  cert. denied, 459 U.S.  1183  (1983).  I do not mean  to endorse legal
prohibitions of this sort.  See infra part VI.A.
63See, e.g.,  W. KIP Viscusi,  FATAL TRADEOFFS:  PUBUC  AND  PRIVATE  RESPONSI-
BILrTIES  FOR  RISK  17  (1992)  ("Addressing  value-of-life  issues  by  focusing on  our
attitudes toward lotteries involving small risks of death provides a methodology for
formulating these issues in a sound economic  manner.").
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purchase  is  dependent  on  context-specific  norms,  the answer  is
probably no.  Social norms in  a relevant community may "subsidize"
the purchase  of Volvos or of a certain safety device.  The decision
to purchase may stem from reputational effects or from the effects
of the purchase on the agent's self-conception.  In  another context,
with different  norms,  reputational  effects  may be  quite different
and,  hence,  choices  will  be  different  as  well.  Perhaps  norms
subsidize the purchase of Volvos but also subsidize a willingness to
travel to especially  dangerous areas.  Because  social norms  affect
choice and diverge according to context, the value a person places
on his safety cannot be described in the abstract.6  Risk-reducing
choices have a great deal to do with norms connected to the setting
in which choices are made.
Some  analysts  suggest  that  people's  decisions  not  to  insure
certain  goods-freedom  from  pain  and  suffering,  the  well-being
of  one's  children-have  important  implications  for  tort  law.65
Perhaps the absence of insurance suggests a judgment that injuries
of that kind do not deserve compensation (by people's own lights).
But  if  the  refusal  to  insure  such  goods  is  a  product  of social
norms that are limited to the context of insurance, it may be wrong
to draw a general conclusion about the appropriate domain of tort
law.66
We may conclude with the suggestion that an important feature
of  social  norms  is  their  enormous  dependence  on  context.  A
complex network of norms govern the purchase of insurance;  these
norms make it difficult to infer, from failures of purchase,  global
judgments about valuation.  The point makes it hazardous  to draw
general inferences from particular choices.67
64 Cf. G.  TOLLEY  ET  AL.,  VALUING  HEALTH  FOR  POLICY  (1994)  (finding large
disparities in people's willingness to pay to reduce different risks).
6See  George L. Priest, The Current  Insurance  Crisis and  Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1546 (1987) ("Individuals...  do not voluntarily insure for non-pecuniary
losses"); Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor  Products  Liability Reform: A  Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE L.J. 353, 367 (1988) ("[G]iven current evidence, the aspect of strict liability
that  prohibits  firms  from shifting  the  risk of incurring  nonpecuniary  harm  to
consumers cannot be justified by reference to the goal of compensating consumers
for harm.").
" See Stephen P. Croley & Jon  D.  Hanson, The Nonpecuniaty Costs of Acddents:
Pain-and-Suffering Damages in  Tort Law,  108  HARv.  L.  REV.  1787,  1914  (1995)
(challenging  the view  that tort  law is  in  need of fundamental  reform  because  it
mandates a type of insurance that the sovereign consumer does not demand). 67 See Sunstein, supra note 16 (manuscript pt. III.A) (discussing some difficulties
with the term "preferences" in light of the role of social norms).ON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF  LAW
D.  Non-fungible Money and Social Norms
Money is generally treated as the paradigm of a fungible good;
one dollar is as good as any other dollar, and no different from it.
But social norms mean that money itself may not be fungible.6  The
uses  of money and  the  place  of different  "kinds"  of money  are
pervasively affected  by social norms.  People put money in differ-
ent mental  compartments  and  act  accordingly.  Some  money  is
specially reserved for the support of children.  Some money is for
gifts.  Some  is for one's  own  special  fun.  Some  money  is to be
given  to charities.  Some  money  is for summer vacation.  Some
money is for a rainy day.  Some money is for celebrations.  If you
receive a fee for a lecture, or a small amount from the lottery, you
may  use  it for a special,  outlandishly  expensive  dinner,  whereas
"other"  money  could  not  in  good  conscience  be  used  for  that
purpose.
Social  norms  create  qualitative  differences  among  human
goods,69 and  these qualitative  differences  are matched  by ingeni-
ous  mental  operations  involving  qualitative  differences  among
different "kinds" of money.  Thus a study of practices  in Orange
County,  California  reports  that  residents  keep  "a  variety  of
domestic  'cash  stashes'--generally  one  in  the  billfold  of  each
adult, children's  allowances and piggy  banks,  a petty cash fund in
a  teapot-equivalent,  a  dish  of  change  for  parking  meters  or
laundry--or  'banked  stashes  of money,'  including  Christmas  club
savings  and  accounts  designated  for  special  expenditures  like
property  or  other  taxes,  vacations,  or  home  and  car  insurance
payments."
7 1
In short, there are complex procedures of "mental accounting,"
in  which  money  that  falls  in  certain  compartments  is  assessed
only  in terms  of its particular  intended  uses,  and not compared
with  money  that  has  been  placed  in  different  mental  compart-
ments.71  We cannot  understand  the uses of money itself without
understanding  the  role  of  social  norms.  Social  theorists  have
often  feared  that  the  use  of money  would  "flatten"  social  life,
above all by erasing qualitative  distinctions.  But it would be more
accurate  to  report  that  social  life,  pervaded  as  it  is  by  social
68 See ZELJZER, supra  note 52, at 18 ("Despite its transferability, people make every
effort to embed money in particular times, places, and social relations."). 69 See ANDERSON,  supra note 14, at 3-8.
70 Id. at 5 (quotingJEAN LAVE,  UNDERSTANDING  PRACTICE  132-33 (1988)).
71 See Thaler, supra note 54  (manuscript at 1-10).
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norms,  has  "unflattened"  money,  by  insisting  on  and  enforcing
qualitative distinctions. 2  "There is no single, uniform, generalized
money, but multiple monies:  people earmark different currencies
for many or perhaps all types of social interactions....  And people
will in fact respond with anger, shock, or ridicule to the 'misuse'  of
monies  for  the  wrong  circumstances  or social  relations  ...  ."s
Thus  laws  barring  the  use  of  money  in  certain  contexts  are
complemented  by norms barring the use of certain money, such as
retirement  money,  for  certain  purposes,  such  as  gambling  or
vacation.
E.  Non-fungible Money and Law
Often  decisions  about  money  can  be  made  through  private
mechanisms  that do not require special  legal help.  These  mecha-
nisms may be as  simple  as a mental  notation.  They may be more
complex,  taking the form  of different bank accounts  understood
to  be  used  for  different  purposes.  Social  norms  in  families
and  small  communities  often  fortify  these  efforts,74  with certain
forms  of money  being  seen  as  "for a  rainy day"  or  as  basically
untouchable.
Law can also play a role.  Some measures  that might be seen as
puzzling, or as objectionably paternalistic,  make more sense if they
are  understood  as  precommitment  strategies  reflecting  diverse
"kinds" of money or as efforts to facilitate people's efforts to place
their  money  in  different  categories.  As  a  facilitative  strategy,
consider  the  Individual  Retirement  Account  (IRA).  IRAs  are
created by a complex set of legal provisions.  One of their virtues is
that they  allow people  more  easily  to separate  their  money into
different  "kinds."  The  social  security  system  is  mandatory,  not
optional,  but it becomes  more  intelligible  if we  understand  that
people often like to have help in putting their money into different
accounts  with  different  uses.  This  is hardly a full  defense  of the
social  security  system  in  its  current  form,  but  it might  help  in
understanding  any  legal  effort  to  allow  or  require  money  to be
separated into different compartments.
72 See id.
73  ZELIZER, supra note 52, at 18-19.
4 See generally Eric A.  Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of  Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U.  CHI. L. REV.  133 (1996).ON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION  OF  LAW
V.  EQUALnTy,  SOCIAL NoRMS,  AND  S6cuAL  CHANGE
Norms of partiality 5 are an important part of social inequality.
Social norms  may require  women  to perform  the most domestic
labor;  in  many  places,  women  who  refuse  to  do  so  incur social
sanctions and  may even  feel  ashamed.  The  social  meaning  of a
woman's  refusal  may  be  a  refusal  to  engage  in  her  appropriate
gender  role." 6  Hence  it may signal a range of undesirable  traits.
In  the  areas  of both  race  and  gender,  prevailing  norms  help
constitute  inequality.  And  here, as elsewhere,  collective action is
necessary to reconstitute existing norms.
Of course private  norm entrepreneurs  may be able to accom-
plish  a  great  deal.  With  respect  to  the  division  of  domestic
labor  between  men  and  women,  private  efforts  at  norm  man-
agement  have  played  an  important  role.  Individual  acts  that
are expressive in character-a refusal to make dinner, for example-
are  an  important part of modern  feminism.  But the  expressive
function  of  law  is  often  especially  important  here,  and  it  can
move  to  the  fore  in  public  debates.  If a  discriminatory  act  is
consistent  with prevailing  norms,  there  will  be  more  in  the way
of  discriminatory  behavior.  If  discriminators  are  ashamed  of
themselves,  there  is  likely  to  be  less  discrimination.  The social
meaning  of an act  of sexual harassment will have  a great deal to
do  with  the  amount  of  sexual  harassment  in  that  particular
environment.  A large point of law may be  to shift social  norms
and  social  meaning.  Consider  in  this  connection  the  fact that
many  restaurant  owners  and  inn-keepers  actually  supported  the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,  which would have prevented  them from
discriminating."  Why would people want the  state to act against
them?  The answer  lies in the fact that the  law helped  shift social
norms and the social meaning of nondiscrimination.  Whereas non-
discrimination would formerly signal a willingness  to act on a race-
neutral basis-and hence  would trigger  social  norms  that call  for
discrimination  against blacks-it would henceforth signal a willing-
75 See ULLMANN-MARGALIT,  supra note 30, at 134-97 (discussing norms involving
partiality and inequality). 76  See  generally  SUSAN  M.  OKIN,  JUSTICE,  GENDER,  AND  THE  FAMILY  (1989)
(discussing the importance  of equitably  distributing labor within  the family  and
rejecting arguments that the gender-structured family is directed by nature or that its
noble virtues preclude equitable redistribution  of labor).
"  See Lessig, supra note 3, at 965-67.
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ness  to  obey  the  law,  and  hence  fail  to  trigger  adverse  social
norms.
7 8
In  Part IV, I dealt with cases in which social norms discourage
cash  payments  in  interpersonal  relationships.  But  social  norms
help constitute  a  wide  range  of qualitatively  different  kinds  of
valuation, 79  and  these  diverse  valuations  much  affect  behavior
and the social meaning of behavior.  These norms are omnipresent
and  are  usually  taken  for  granted.  Imagine,  for  example,  that
John treats a beautiful diamond in the same way that most people
treat friends, or that Jane values a plant in the same way that most
people value their children, or that Sandy values her car like most
people  value  art  or  literature.  Antidiscrimination  law  is  often
designed  to change norms so as  to ensure  that people are treated
with  a  kind  of dignity  and  respect  that  discriminatory  behavior
seems to deny.
The point is not limited to race and sex equality.  Consider, as
an especially interesting example, the movement for animal rights.
Some people think that animals should be treated with dignity and
respect, and not as  if  they  existed  solely for human consumption
and use."  This view is very much about social norms;  it need not
entail the further claim that animal life is  infinitely valuable.  It  is
best taken as a recommendation for a shift in norms governing the
treatment  of animals,  accompanied  by  a judgment  that  the  new
norms  will  have  consequences  for what  human  beings  do.  The
recommendation  may be based on the view that, if  we see animals
(and nature  in general)  in this way,  we will solve collective action
problems faced by human beings in preserving animal life important
for human  lives;  it may be based  on a noninstrumental  effort  to
extend  ideals  of  basic  dignity  to  all  living  things.  Of  course
judgments of this kind must be defended.
VI.  QUALIFICATIONS
The discussion thus far has certainly not been exhaustive.  There
are many areas in which law is used in an expressive way, largely in
order to manage  social norms.  The criminal  law is a prime arena
for the expressive function of law; and as we have seen, the debate
718  See id.
"  See ANDERSON,  supra note 14, at 5-20.
80  See PETER SINGER,  ANIMAL  LIBERATION:  A NEW  ETHIcS  FOR OUR TREATMENT
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over flag burning has everything to do with the statement that law
makes.  I hope I have said enough thus far to show the wide range
of possible  "expressions"  via  law and to  see  how the law  might
plausibly be used to manage social norms.
In  this Section  I qualify the basic  argument.  The first set of
qualifications stems from a hard question:  How might participants
in  law  compare  the  statement  made  by  law  with  the  (direct)
consequences produced by law?  What if the statement seems right
but the consequences  are unfortunate?  The second set of qualifica-
tions emerges from the need to impose constraints on the expres-
sive function of law.  Both of these issues are extremely large and
complex.  I restrict myself to a few brief observations.
A.  Consequences
I  have  suggested  that some  expressivists  are concerned  with
norm  management,  whereas  others  are  concerned  with  the
"statement" law makes entirely apart from its consequences.  As the
epigraph from Herbert Simon suggests, expressivists can seem both
fanatical  and  ineffectual-a  most  unfortunate  combination.  For
those  who  endorse  the  expressive  function  of  law,  the  most
important testing cases arise when (a) people support laws because
of the statement made by such laws but (b) the effects of such laws
seem bad or ambiguous,  even  by reference  to the values  held by
their supporters.  How should such cases be understood?  My basic
proposition  is  that,  at least for purposes of law,  any support  for
"statements" should be rooted not simply in the intrinsic value of
the statement, but also in plausible judgments  about its  effect  on
social  norms  and  hence  in  "on  balance"  judgments  about  its
consequences.81  Here  we  can  bridge  the  gap  between  con-
sequentialists and  expressivists  by showing that good expressivists
are consequentialists  too.
Consider,  for  example,  the  debate  over  emissions  trading  in
environmental  law.  Some  of  the  most  pervasive  objections  to
emissions  trading  are  expressive  in  nature.82  Critics  claim  that
81 This  is a difference between law and the case of the individual agent, where
Williams's  view  seems  more  convincing.  See  Williams,  supra note  21,  at  85-88
(explaining that the relation of an individual agent's action to the good state of  affairs
that accompanies  the action "may not be that of cause  to effect-the  good state of
affairs may be constituted,  or partly constituted, by  the agent's doing that act").
I See  KELMAN,  supra note  11,  at 27-28  (arguing that a society  "fails to  make a
statement stigmatizing polluting behavior" when it relies upon economic incentives
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emissions trading has damaging effects on social norms by making
environmental amenities seem like any other commodity:  a good
that has its price, to be set through market mechanisms.  Thus they
suggest that emissions  trading systems may have damaging effects
on social  norms by making people see  the  environment as  some-
thing without special claims  to public protection.  To some extent
the  suggestion  might  be  taken  as  an  empirical  prediction  and
evaluated  as such.  Will emissions trading systems have substantial
effects on social norms associated with the environment?
On that issue, we may be able to make some progress.  We have
an empirical question subject, in principle,  to empirical resolution.
If emissions trading programs could be shown to have bad effects
on social norms, they might be rejected notwithstanding their other
virtues; perhaps the overall effects on such programs would be bad.
(Compare  this  to  the  question  whether  to  require  recycling;
mandatory recycling might well  have better effects on norms than
curbside charges.)  But in the area of emissions  trading programs,
a  high  degree  of  skepticism  is  appropriate  with  respect  to  the
expressivist's concern.  Public attitudes toward the environment do
not  depend  much  on whether  government  has  a  command-and-
control system or instead relies on economic incentives.
Of course, some people appear to think that consequences are
barely  relevant,  and  that  it  is  intrinsically  problematic  to  "say,"
through law, that environmental amenities are ordinary goods with
appropriate  prices.  Is  this a  good objection  to emissions  trading
programs if (as we might suppose) such programs can save billions
of dollars in return for the same  degree of environmental  protec-
tion?" 3  I do not believe  that the  objection  has  much force  if,  in
fact,  costs are lower, jobs are saved,  the air  is cleaner, norms are
held constant, and fewer people are poor. On what basis should the
"statement" made by law be taken to be cause for concern?
Or  take  the  issue  of minimum  wage  legislation.  A  possible
justification  for  such  legislation  is  expressive  in  nature.  Some
people might think that government ought to make a statement to
the effect that human labor is worth, at a minimum, $X per hour;
perhaps  any amount less  than $X seems like an assault  on human
to carry out environmental  policies).
" See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, ReformingEnvironmental  Law: The
Democratic  Case  forMarket Incentives, 13 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) (arguing that
the  environmental  regulation  debate  is  flawed  because  it fails  to  focus  on  the
comparative  consequences  of alternate solutions).ON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF LAW
dignity.  But suppose too  that the  consequence  of the  minimum
wage  is  to  increase  unemployment  among  the  most  vulnerable
members  of society."  It is  not  easy  to  know  how to  weigh  the
"statement" against the bad consequences.  Part of the attraction of
the expressive view is that inquiries  into consequences often seem
difficult and complex, and perhaps not subject to resolution at all.
But if an increase in the minimum wage would really drive vulnera-
ble people out of the workplace in significant numbers, it is hard to
see why people should support it.  We can thus see that expressive
approaches  to law verge on fanaticism where effects on norms are
unlikely and where  the consequences  of the  "statement" are bad.
In this  sense,  there  is  ample  reason  to endorse  Herbert  Simon's
remarks at the beginning of this Article.
The debate  over flag burning is an especially  revealing case  in
point.  It seems reasonable to suppose that the principal effect of a
constitutional amendment allowing flag burning to be criminalized
would  be to increase  the number of acts of flag burning.  Even if
this is so, many people would support the amendment because of
its expressive value.  Perhaps their view makes sense if the amend-
ment would  have  significant  effects  on social norms  and if those
effects would be good.  But if these are not simultaneously likely-
and they do not seem to be-it is far from clear that it makes sense
to devote a substantial amount of public and private resources  to
promoting an amendment dealing with flag burning.
Thus  far,  I have  tried  to  resolve  a  possible  debate  between
expressivists  and  consequentialists  by  suggesting  that,  without
desirable  effects  on  social  norms,  there  is  not  much  point  in
endorsing expressively motivated  law.  At most, we  might say that
good  statements  are  worth  supporting  when  judgments  about
consequences  are  unclear.  But  we  may  be  able  to  make  more
progress  by rethinking the  relationship  between expressivists  and
consequentialists.  I have suggested that good expressivists  are also
consequentialists, but we may speculate too that all good consequen-
tialists are ultimately expressivists,  at least in the general sense that
an  expressive  theory of some sort helps people to identify conse-
quences  as  such.  This will  not entirely bridge  what I  have been
' This  is  of course  a  disputed  question.  Compare DAVID  CARD  & ALAN  B.
KRUEGER,  MYrH  AND  MEASUREMENT:  THE NEW ECONOMICS  OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
(1995)  (analyzing studies showing that minimum wage increases  have no effect on
employment)  with  FINIS  WELCH,  MINIMUM  WAGES:  ISSUES  AND  EVIDENCE  (1978)
(claiming  that minimum wage increases produce  greater unemployment).
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treating  as  a  gap  between  the  two  camps;  but  it  may  make  it
necessary to recharacterize the opposition.
We  might  be  tempted  to  suppose  that  people  can  avoid
expressive  concerns  entirely and  that it  is possible  to  assess  law
solely on the basis of consequences-that an open-ended, "all things
considered" inquiry into consequences  is a feasible way of evaluat-
ing legal rules.s5  But this is not actually  possible.  The effects  of
any legal rule can be described in  an infinite number of ways.  Any
particular characterization  or accounting of consequences will  rest
not on some depiction of the brute facts; instead it will be mediated
by  a  set  of (often  tacit)  norms  determining  how  to  describe  or
conceive of consequences.  It is possible to see a large part of the
expressive function of law in the identification of what consequenc-
es count and how they should be described.  Something of this sort
is inevitable.  Because any conception of consequences  is interpre-
tive and thus evaluative in character,  simple or unmediated  conse-
quentialism is not a feasible project for law (or for anything else).
More precisely, any description of the effects of some legal rule
is a product of expressive norms that give consequences identifiable
social  meanings-including  norms  that deny  legal  significance  to
certain  consequences.  When  it seems  as  if we  can  talk  about
consequences  alone,  it  is  only  because  the  mediating  expressive
norms are so widely shared that they present no controversy.
To say this does not make expressive approaches  to law less than
distinctive.  Many people focus on the "statement" made by law, and
vote accordingly, without inquiring into the (expressively mediated)
consequences  of the law.  We have seen that this is  true of capital
punishment, flag burning, and more.  Many people  are especially
interested in the effects of law on social norms.  Probably the best
conception of expressivism, for law, is very much focused on conse-
quences-not  simply consequences  for norms-and  self-conscious
about the  expressive  norms  that make  consequences  count,  and
make different consequences  count in different ways.
B.  Constraints,  Liberal and Otherwise
What  barriers  should  there  be  to  governmental  efforts  at
managing  social  norms?  The  simplest  answer  is  that  the  same
barriers  as  there  are  to  any  other  kind  of governmental  action
"This  is an aspiration of cost-benefit analysis.ON THE EXPRESSIVE  FUNCTION OF  LAW
should apply.  There is nothing distinctive about norm management
that requires a special set of constraints.
86
Thus,  for  example,  government  should  not  be  permitted  to
invade  rights, whatever our understanding  of rights  may be.  The
rights  constraints  that apply  to  government  action  generally  are
applicable here as well.  If government tried to change social norms
so as  to ensure  that everyone  is a Christian,  it would  violate  the
right to religious liberty; if government tried to change social norms
so as to ensure that women occupy domestic roles, and men do not,
it  would  violate  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.  At  least  these
conclusions make sense if government action  is coercive.
87
Quite apart from  the question of rights,  there is  always a risk
that efforts  at norm management will be futile or counterproduc-
tive.  We can imagine, for example, that when  government attempts
to move social norms in a particular direction, it may fail miserably.
Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" policy with respect to drugs may well
be an example.  It is necessary  to ensure that those who engage  in
norm management  are trusted by the people whose norms are  at
issue.  For this reason it may be best for government to attempt to
enlist intermediate  organizations,  so as to ensure that people with
authority in relevant communities are participating in the process.
Some  people  would  go  further  than  this.  On  one  view,  any
effort at norm management  is  illegitimate;  this  is a project that is
off limits to government.  But it is hard to see how this argument
might be made persuasive.  Effects  on social norms are not easily
avoided;  any  system  of  government  is  likely  to  affect  norms,
including  creation  of  the  basic  systems  of  contract,  tort,  and
property.  Moreover,  intentional  norm  management  is  a conven-
tional and time-honored  part of government.  Of course we could
imagine abuses,  even unspeakable  ones.  But the proper response
is  to  insist  on  a  wide  range  of rights-based  constraints  on  the
management of social norms through law.88
'  Indeed government engages in norm management on a regular basis, whether
or not it does so intentionally.  See Lessig, supra note 3, at 945-46.
11 At present there appear to be  few constitutional constraints on propaganda
campaigns.  See MARK  G. YUDOF,  WHEN  GOVERNMENT  SPEAKS:  POLrTICS,  LAW AND
GOVERNMENT  EXPRESSION  IN AMERICA 52-55  (1978).
" Relevant here is the suggestion that government may not attempt to vindicate
'external  preferences," that is, preferences about what other people should prefer.
See RONALD  DWORKIN,  TAKING RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY  234-38  (1977).  I believe that the
supposed  prohibition  is  rooted  in  confusions;  it does  not sort  out  the idea  of
"preference,"  and  it  obtains  its  force  from  hypothetical  cases  involving  rights
violations having nothing to do with external preferences.  See.JOSEPH  RAz,  ETHICS
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There is a final point.  The social meaning of law will constrain
the legitimate or permissible content of law.  The meaning, set as
it is by social norms, may make government efforts unsuccessful.  As
Daniel  Kahan  has  shown,  for  example,  debates  over  criminal
sanctions  are  strongly  affected  by  this  problem.89   So-called
intermediate  sanctions for criminal  violations are often unpopular
because  they  are taken  to  "mean"  something  other  than  public
opprobrium.  When  a  violator  is  told  to  engage  in  community
service, he appears  to have  "gotten off,"  even if  the service  is,  to
him, worse than a short period injail.  Hence the social meaning of
the law makes the law unacceptable  to the community at large.  If
intermediate sanctions are to be feasible, the norms that accompany
them must shift as well.
The point is a general one.  The meaning of legal statements is
a function of social norms,  not of the  speaker's  intentions.  The
government may take a range of steps to discourage teenagers from
smoking;  but if  those  steps  make smoking  seem  like  a delicious
forbidden fruit, they may be counterproductive.  Measures designed
to discourage  unwed  parenthood  may  actually  encourage  unwed
parenthood.  This is simply a special case of the general phenome-
non of unintended consequences. 9 0  Of course unintended effects,
either realized because of existing norms or in the form of unantici-
pated changes  in existing norms, may be good as well as bad.
C.  Norm Management and Communication
For law to perform its expressive function well,  it is important
that law communicate  well.9"  Unfortunately,  "law" is not an agent
and it cannot speak.  Statute books are  rarely read and are barely
intelligible when they are read. The same is even more emphatically
true for the Federal Register.  Supreme Court  decisions are at best
filtered  through newspapers  and magazines.  Thus,  the use of law
for norm management receives articulation through the anticipation
IN THE PUBLIc DOMAIN 94-98 (1994); Sunstein, supra note 16 (manuscript pt. IV.A.4).
9 See Kahan,  supra note  14  (manuscript  at 17)  ("[T]he  failure  of alternative
sanctions to displace imprisonment stems from their social meaning.").
o For a discussion of the unintended  cultural consequences  of legal  rules, see
Pildes, supra note  13,  at  937  (discussing  the  need  to  influence  specific  public
programs by "attend[ing] to profound disaffections with the modern regulatory state"
and by recognizing that "public values are constituted  not only at the grandest levels
of policy formation, but also in the  myriad microscopic  day-to-day experiences of
policy").
"  I am grateful  to Robert Ellickson for raising this point.ON THE EXPRESSIVE  FUNCTION  OF  LAW
and enforcement of sanctions and through clarifying and supporting
statements by politicians.
This  fact  can  create  a  range  of  problems  for  effective  law
enforcement.  The statement made by law may be different from the
statement heard by the audience, because the sanctions are inade-
quately understood and because the supporting statements can be
unintelligible or misleading.  If the law's expressive function is to be
performed  well,  it is important  to develop  ways  to reduce  these
problems.  A good beginning would be the wealth  of work about
effective and ineffective risk communication.
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CONCLUSION
There  can be no doubt that law, like action  in general,  has an
expressive function.  Some people do what they do mostly because
of the statement the act makes;  the same is true for those who seek
changes in law.  Many debates over the appropriate content of law
are really debates  over the statement that law makes, independent
of its (direct) consequences.  I have suggested  that the expressive
function  of law has  a great deal  to do with the  effects  of law on
prevailing  social  norms.  Often  law's  "statement"  is  designed  to
move norms in fresh directions.
Least controversially,  law  may attempt  to generate norms that
will solve collective action problems.  The central point here is that
from the  standpoint of individual agents,  norms are  given rather
than chosen, and  agents would  sometimes like norms to be  other
than what they are.  Often shifts in norms are a low-cost method of
achieving  widely  or  universally  held  social  goals-as  the  intrinsic
utility of choice stays constant while the reputational consequences
of choice begin to shift.  Far more controversial is the use of law to
fortify  social  norms  involving  the  permissible  use  of money.  A
liberal society ensures a measure of sphere differentiation, in which
the realm of markets and market thinking is  not coextensive  with
the realms of politics and family life.  Hence social norms regulating
the use of money are an important part of a well-functioning liberal
society.  Sometimes law is used to fortify those norms or to prevent
them  from becoming atrophied.  Bans  on the sale  of sexual and
reproductive  capacities are an important illustration.
'2 See, e.g., Morgan et al., Communicating Risks to the Public,  26 ENVTL.  Sci. TECH.
2048 (1992).
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For purposes of legal policy, some of the most interesting cases
of norm  management  through  law  involve  the  control  of risky
behavior and the promotion  of social  equality.  Risky behavior  is
often a product of social norms that people would very much like,
on reflection, to change.  And with respect to risk, American society
has  witnessed  dramatic  changes  in  prevailing  norms  in  the  last
decades.  Cigarette  smoking  is  the  most  striking  example,  but
similar  shifts  can be  seen  in  the  areas  of alcohol  use,  drug use,
seatbelt use, carrying guns, and diet and exercise.  If  government
sees prevailing norms  as a  tax on or a subsidy to choice,  it  might
seek to change norms as  a way of changing choices.  Certainly the
point helps account for antidiscimination poicy, where a goal is to
alter  norms  associated  with  both  taste-based  discrimination  and
rational stereotyping.
Are efforts at norm management unacceptably paternalistic  or
illiberal?  In many cases they are not.  As I have emphasized, norms
are generally given rather than chosen.  Sometimes  people would
like norms to be changed; often they do not have a considered view
about which norms are best, but, if they reflected  a bit, they would
wish norms to be something other than what they are.  When  this
is so, it is entirely legitimate  to use law to alter norms that encour-
age  people to shorten their own  lives,  at least when they do so  in
order  to avoid reputational  cost  and without much in  the way  of
increased  intrinsic utility.  Certainly efforts  at norm management
are  more  legitimate  if  they  have  a  democratic  pedigree.  More
generally, attention to the effects  of social norms helps show that
"choices" should not be taken as sacrosanct.9 3
All  this leaves  open  a number  of questions.  Among  the most
pressing are  empirical  ones.  Why do norm  cascades occur?  To
what extent have  shifts in norms been a function of law?  How can
law be made effective in shifting norms?  What variables account for
effective norm-change?  There are also important theoretical issues
about constraints on norm management.  It is particularly important
to  decide  how  to  handle  situations  in  which  laws  motivated  by
expressive goals  have mixed or bad consequences.  I have argued
that legal "statements" producing bad consequences should not be
endorsed.  But my simplest suggestion here is that we begin to make
93  See Lessig, supra note 3, at 951 (arguing that "social meanings exist" and that
"their force in part hangs upon their restingupon a certain uncontested, or taken-for-
granted, background of thought or expectation"); Sunstein, supra  note 16 (manuscript
pt. llI.A) (discussing relationships  between choices and norms).1996]  ON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION  OF  LAW  2053
sense of law's expressive function if we attend to the role of law in
the  management  of social norms.  No system  of law  can entirely
avoid  that role;  even  markets  themselves-which  are very much  a
creation  of law-are  exercises  in  norm  management.  In  these
circumstances  it  is best for government  to proceed pragmatically
and  contextually,  seeing which  norms are obstacles  to well-being,
and using law when law is effective in providing correctives.